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Damage detection systems (DDS) provide information of the structural system integrity in contrast to e.g. local 
information by inspections or non-destructive testing techniques. In this paper, an approach is developed and 
demonstrated to utilize DDS information to update the structural system reliability and to integrate this 
information in structural system risk and utility analyses. For this aim, a novel performance modelling of DDS 
building upon their system characteristics and non-destructive testing reliability is introduced. The DDS 
performance modelling accounts for a measurement system in combination with a damage detection algorithm 
attached to a structural system in the reference and damage states and is modelled with the probability of 
indication accounting for type I and II errors. In this way, the basis for DDS performance comparison and 
assessment is provided accounting for the dependencies between the damage states in a structure. For updating 
of the structural system reliability, an approach is developed based on Bayesian updating facilitating the use of 
DDS information on structural system level and thus for a structural system risk analysis. The structural system 
risk analysis encompasses the static, dynamic, deterioration, reliability and consequence models, which provide 
the basis for the system model for calculating the direct risks due to component failure and the indirect risks 
due to system failure. Two case studies with the developed approach demonstrate a high Value of DDS 
Information due to risk and expected cost reduction. 
KEYWORDS: Damage detection, Value of Information, Structural systems, Damage detection uncertainty 
modelling 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Damage detection systems (DDS) provide information about the integrity and the performance of a structural 
system. The performance of a structural system is characterized by its safety, i.e. the system reliability and risks, 
and its functionality, i.e. the associated expected benefits and costs. The structural system reliability is modelled 
with failure and damage mechanisms based on the static and dynamical system behaviour. The failure and 
damage mechanisms have generally a statistical dependence caused by common influencing factors, such as 
environmental conditions, production and construction processes and material characteristics [21, 49, 52]. 
Damage detection information is characterized by providing an indication of damage of a structural system 
subjected to a finite precision [16]. The damage detection information provided by a measurement system and 
a damage detection algorithm (DDA) refers to a change in the structural system characteristics in relation to a 
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reference state of the structural system [15,7]. Damage detection information thus account for the dependencies 
in the entire structural system. 
Both, structural system performance modelling and damage detection algorithms, have progressed 
significantly but separately in the scientific literature during the last decades, see e.g. [9, 14, 37] and [4, 13, 15, 
17]. However, it has been demonstrated that structural system identification based on response measurements 
can be combined with updating of the structural reliability and that such information contribute to the accuracy 
of the structural condition and thus to the structural safety, see e.g. [48].  
In this paper we focus thus (1) on explicitly modelling the system characteristics for the structural system 
and the DDS system including their costs, consequences and functionalities (Section 2), (2) on utilising DDS 
for updating the structural system reliability (Section 3) and (3) on identifying conditions under which DDS 
information may have a high value by utilising the Bayesian decision analysis (Section 4). The developed 
approaches are elaborated with two case studies, namely (1) an example focussing on how the structural system 
reliability can be updated and how a risk reduction can be achieved (Section 3.4) and (2) a case study containing 
a Value of DDS Information analysis of a bridge girder under high degradation (Section 5). The paper closes 
with conclusions in Section 6. 
2 STRUCTURAL PERFORMANCE MODELLING, INSPECTION AND DAMAGE DETECTION 
PERFORMANCE MODELLING 
In this section, the characteristics of the structural performance modelling and damage detection monitoring are 
outlined. 
2.1 Structural system performance and risks modelling 
The performance of a structural system is characterized by its safety, i.e. the system reliability and risks, and 
its functionality, i.e. the associated expected benefits and costs. The structural system reliability and risk are 
described by means of the structural system theory. It takes basis in the probabilistic mechanical behaviour of 
the system in conjunction with its loading, resistance and deterioration models and the quantification of the 
system risks and utilities in conjunction with a consequence model.  
Structural failure can be caused by static or dynamic extreme loading of the system and/or its components. 
An extreme structural system loading implies a high statistical dependence of the component loadings. The 
dependence in the resistance is governed by the production (e.g. section properties and material parameters) 
and the construction process (e.g. imperfections) of the structure (see e.g. [21]). Deterioration may cause 
damages to the structural system and can affect the entire structural system or can occur at different locations 
and in different time periods, depending on the material and the nature of the damage mechanism. The spatial 
and componential dependence of a damage mechanism can thus vary significantly (as e.g. for fatigue of steel 
structures, see e.g. [26]). Failures of the structural system and its components caused by damage mechanisms 
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rely thus on the structural system characteristics and the loading, resistance and damage mechanisms 
dependencies [37]. 
The performance of a structural system both in regard to system failure and system damage can be described 
with logical systems, Daniels Systems, Bayesian networks (e.g. [19], [9] and [29]). In general, the probability 
 SP F  of a structural system failure is calculated by integrating the joint probability density over the space of 
system failure 
SF
 ,  
   
S
FS
S FP F f d

  X X , (1) 
where the system failure space 
SF
   may be e.g. defined with limit state functions. 
The structural risks can then be calculated with the component and system probability of failure (  iP F  and 
 SP F ) and the consequences of component and system failure ( cC  and SC ). The risk may be classified into 
direct risk due to component failure and indirect risks due to system failure ( DR  and IDR ) tasking basis in [2]: 
   c
1
cn
D ID i S S
i
R R R P F C P F C

      . (2) 
2.2 Damage detection  
Automatic damage detection methods in a structural health monitoring (SHM) context are based on the chosen 
measurement technology for the desired monitoring aim [16], [17]. To illustrate the integration of damage 
detection information into the performance analysis of a structure, a vibration-based damage detection method 
is considered in the following. 
Vibration monitoring is one of the most known and developed techniques for long term SHM and has been 
recognized as an addition or alternative to visual inspections or local non-destructive testing performed 
manually, see [15], [16], [25], [12]. The rationale is that damages have an effect on the structural stiffness, and 
thus on the modal parameters (modal frequencies, damping ratios and mode shapes) which characterize the 
dynamics of the structure. A network of vibration sensors (usually accelerometers) is attached to the structure, 
measuring continuously the structural vibration response to ambient excitation like wind, traffic, waves or other 
sources. Changes in the measured signals with respect to the dynamic characteristics of the structure then 
indicate damage. Since changes in the environmental conditions (like temperature changes) also lead to changes 
in the signals, they must be taken care of (e.g. [3], [8]). 
Methods for vibration-based damage detection compare measurement data from a (healthy) reference state 
of the structure with data from the current, potentially damaged state. An alarm is raised if a distance measure 
between both states exceeds a threshold. There are many methods for damage detection in this context [7]. For 
example, a straightforward approach is to identify the modal parameters from measurements of both the 
reference and current states, and to compare them directly [25]. Other methods confront current measurements 
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to a reference in a statistical distance measure, without modal parameter identification. For instance, such 
methods include non-parametric change detection based on novelty detection [43], Kalman filter innovations 
[6], methods from machine learning [16] and many more. Belonging also to this class of methods, the statistical 
subspace-based damage detection methods (see [4], [5], [11], [12], [13]) offer a flexible and theoretically well 
founded framework that we use in this paper. 
In the following, the subspace-based damage detection algorithm is introduced as an example of global 
automated damage detection methods. With this method, vibration measurements from the current system are 
compared to a reference state in a subspace-based residual vector. In a hypothesis test, the uncertainties of the 
residual are taken into account and the respective 
2  test statistic is compared to a threshold in order to decide 
if the structure is damaged or not. Based on these properties, the 
2  test statistic is considered as the damage 
indicator value (DIV) for damage monitoring.  
2.2.1 Dynamic structural system model  
The behaviour of the monitored structure is assumed to be described by a linear time-invariant dynamical 
system 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Fz t z t z t v t  C KM  (3) 
where t denotes continuous time, M, C and K m m  are the mass, damping and stiffness matrices, vector 
mz  collects the displacements of the m degrees of freedom of the structure, and ( )Fv t  is the external force 
which is usually unmeasured for long-term monitoring. Observing the structural system (3) with a set of r 
acceleration sensors yields the measurements  
(( )) ) (z ey t tL t  (4) 
where 
ry  is the measurement vector, matrix r mL   indicates the sensor locations and e is the 
measurement noise.  
Measurements are taken at discrete time instants t k , where k is an integer and τ the time step. Sampling 
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respectively, and the appropriate state noise and output noise terms are kv  and kw . The state noise is related to 
the unmeasured external force 
Fv , and the output noise depends both on Fv  and the measurement noise e. Both 
noise terms are assumed to be stationary white noise for the theoretical outline of the damage detection method. 
While this assumption seems to be restrictive in real applications on civil structures where the ambient 
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excitation may rather be modelled by non-stationary and coloured noise, some robustness of the damage 
detection method to these conditions has been shown [4], which is supported by several case studies on 
structures in operation, e.g. [12]. The theoretical system order of system (5) is the dimension of the states, n = 
2m. Note that the above modelling is not only valid for acceleration measurements as in (4), but generalizable 
to displacement and velocity measurements. 
The modal parameters of the model in Equ. (3)-(4), i.e. the natural frequencies, damping ratios and observed 
mode shapes, are equivalently found in the system matrices ( , )A C  of model (5). Damages in the monitored 
system correspond to changes in the matrices M, C and K in Equ. (3), e.g. loss of mass or loss of stiffness, and 
affect thus the system matrices ( , )A C  and the modal parameters. Hence, damages in model (3) can be 
equivalently detected as changes in the modal properties related to system matrices ( , )A C  in Equ. (5). 
Based on measurements ky  of the monitored system from a reference and from a possibly damaged state, a 
residual vector is defined based on subspace properties without identifying the system matrices ( , )A C , as 
outlined in the following sections. 
2.2.2 Subspace properties 
From measurement data 
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where p and q are chosen parameters (usually 1p q  ) with min( , )pr qr n  [11]. Then, they are filled into 































and controllability matrix . Matrix  can be obtained from a singular value decomposition (SVD) of , 
truncated at the model order n, as 










 . (9) 
Note that the truncated singular values correspond to noise and are usually small, i.e. 0 0  .  
Once  is obtained from Equ. (7) and (9), the system matrices ( , )A C  can be extracted from Equ. (8) for 
subspace-based system identification (see [30], [10]), from which the modal parameters could be obtained. 
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Instead of doing this system identification step, however, the subspace properties are used for the definition of 
a damage detection residual and a subsequent damage detection test. 
2.2.3 Damage detection residual and test 
Let 
0
 be a Hankel matrix (Equ. (7)) filled with data from a (healthy) reference state, and let its SVD in Equ. 
(9) be given. Define its left null space matrix S, obtained as 0S U  in Equ. (9), such that 
0 0TS  .  
Now, let new measurements 
1, ,{ }k k Ny    from an unknown state of the system be given, from which a new 
Hankel matrix  is computed. If the data comes from the system in the reference state, S is still a null space of 
 since the modal parameters and thus matrices ( , )A C  (up to a change of basis) are unchanged. Thus, 0
TS   
is a characteristic property of the system in the reference state. 
However, if the system is damaged, the modal properties related to matrices ( , )A C  and thus  in Equ. (8) 
change, and the mean of the product 
TS  deviates from 0. Note that matrix  is computed from data and does 
not depend on the state basis of matrices ( , )A C . These properties lead to the definition of the residual vector 
(see [4], [5], [13]) 
vec( )TN S   (10) 
where N is the number of samples on which  is computed. This residual vector is asymptotically Gaussian 
(for large N) with zero mean in the reference state and non-zero mean in the damaged state [4]. Thus, a change 
in the system corresponds to a deviation from 0 in the mean value of the residual vector. The corresponding 
hypothesis test (for a decision between H0: the system is in the reference state, and H1: the system is in a 
damaged state) leads to the test statistic  
1Td     (11) 
where ( )T E  is the residual covariance matrix. An estimate of   is the sample covariance that is 
computed on several realizations of the residual using measurement data in the reference state. Due to the 
distribution properties of the residual, the test statistic (11) is asymptotically 
2  distributed with a non-
centrality parameter in the damaged state [4] [13]. To decide if the monitored structure is damaged or not, the 
test statistic is compared to a threshold. Based on realizations of the test statistic in the reference state, the 
threshold is typically chosen so that the probability of false alarms (type I error) is below some chosen level, 
while keeping in mind that a lower probability of false alarms (lower type I error) also leads to a lower 
probability of indication (higher type II error) for small damages. In practice, a trade-off between both needs to 
be made. In the following, the event of indication is defined as a detection of damage, i.e. when the test statistic 
exceeds the threshold. Note that the terms probability of indication (PoI) and probability of detection (PoD) 
can be used equivalently. Thanks to the previous properties, the test statistic (11) is considered as the DIV in 
the following analysis. 
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Note that Equ. (11) is the non-parametric version of the damage detection test [3] [13]. A detailed description 
of the statistical framework and more theoretical and computational insight of this method is given in [4] [11] 
[13]. 
3 UPDATING THE STRUCTRAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY WITH DAMAGE DETECTION 
INFORMATION  
The approach to update the structural system reliability and risks is developed in Section 3.3 based on an 
outline of the inspection and measurement performance modelling (Section 3.1) and the DDS performance 
modelling (Section 3.2). 
3.1 Inspection and measurement performance modelling 
The inspection and measurement performance can be modelled based on the approaches of non-destructive 
testing/evaluation/inspection (NDT, NDI or NDE) reliability modelling, see e.g. [44], [34], [18]. In the 
following the methods of NDT modelling are reviewed and a consistent NDT performance modelling is 
introduced providing the basis for the DDS performance assessment. 
The NDT reliability calculation is based upon modelling or measuring the signal given a damage and the 
noise (given no damage) of the NDT hardware. Assume that an indication event I  is defined when the signal 
exceeds a pre-defined threshold Dt . Depending of this threshold, the conditional probabilities of the indication 
event are calculated with the signal s  and the noise 0s , where Dn  component damage states of a structural 
component are modelled as discrete and disjoint, i.e. , 1, ,j Dj n  , and 0  is defined as the undamaged state. 
The probability of the complementary events indication ( I ) and no-indication ( I ) for a component damage 
state 
j , namely ( | )jP I   and ( | )jP I   respectively, are determined by integrating the probability density f 
of the signal,  
 ( | ) | d
Dt
j jP I f s s

   ,           (12) 




P I f s s

   .                           (13) 
The probability of indication and no-indication given no damage ( 0( | )P I   and 0( | )P I  ) are calculated by 
integrating the noise 0s , 
 0 0 0 0( | ) | d
Dt
P I f s s

   ,  (14) 
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 0 0 0 0( | ) | d
Dt
P I f s s

   .                 (15) 
Note that these probabilities are given for an upper boundary threshold Dt , i.e. damage is indicated when the 
signal exceeds this threshold, but they can be easily generalized to the case of, e.g., lower boundary or two-
sided thresholds. The probability densities f of the noise and the signal can be determined with inter-laboratory 
tests performed independently several times (so called round robin tests) which imply a frequentistic basis (as 
e.g. summarized in [44], [34], [18]) or analytically and numerically by simulating the NDT process (see e.g. 
[42], [33]). 
With Equ. (12) to (15), the probability of indication (PoI), the probability of false alarm (PFA) and the 
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) are defined. An example of a PoI (or probability of detection, PoD) 
plot covering the probability of indication given no damage, 
0 , and different damage states, , 1, ,j Dj n  , 
is depicted in Figure 1 for a constant threshold. Please note that the diagram contains a (non-zero) probability 
of indication given no damage (
0 ) which is also referred to as the probability of false alarm. 
 
 
Figure 1: Exemplary probability of indication curve for one component 
 
The PFA is defined as the probability of indication given an undamaged structural component 0( | )P I  , see 
e.g. [22]. It is understood that the PFA is caused by noise, since damage is absent by definition. Data 
normalizing efforts usually aim at reducing or averaging out the noise [17]. The ROC is a plot of the PoI, 
( | )iP I  , against the PFA, 0( | )P I  , for a particular damage state i  but varying threshold Dt . 
The approach of NDT reliability modelling as outlined above has recently been applied on a component 
level to model the PoI of damage detection algorithms (DDA), for example with the purpose of assessing their 
quality, see e.g. [22], [38], [40]. For this aim the signal is defined as the DIV in a damaged state and the noise 
is defined as the DIV produced by the damage detection algorithm in the reference state, i.e. the state where the 
structural system is undamaged. With these definitions, the probabilities of indication and no-indication given 







 | jP I 
j0
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3.2 Damage detection system performance modelling 
In order to apply the above NDT reliability modelling to DDS, important characteristics of the DDS 
information have to be taken into account, namely,  
(a) DDS information are provided by algorithms processing measurement system signals, and 
(b) the measurement system is attached to a structural system, and 
(c) the DDS is operated by humans. 
In particular, regarding (a), the DIV is usually a random variable due to statistical signal processing of finite 
measurement data. Amongst others, its statistical properties are influenced by measurement uncertainties, 
uncertain environmental conditions like properties of the ambient excitation and data length. Regarding (b), the 
DIV for damage detection is a value that indicates changes of the entire structural system. Damages in each of 
the components can thus have a different influence on the DIV. Hence, the damage states of the system need to 
be defined in conjunction with the structural components and the structural system performance. DDS 
information are subjected to human errors (c), which need to be considered [42].  
These two major DDS characteristics are incorporated as follows. The structural system is discretized into 
cn  components with discrete damage states. For example, these components may correspond to the elements of 
a finite element model of the structure. Let each of the components {1, , }ci n   have  1Dn   possible states, 
namely an undamaged state and Dn  damaged states. For simplicity of notation, an equal number of Dn  damaged 
states is assumed for each component, which can be easily generalized. The respective states are denoted by 
, ii j
 , where 0ij   for the undamaged state and 1, ,i Dj n   for the damaged states of component i.  Then, a 
full discretization of the structural system states contains the possible combinations of all these states, 
amounting to  1 1c
n
Dn    system damage states plus the undamaged state. Each of these states corresponds then 
to a particular set of matrices describing the monitored system in (3), where the damage states correspond to 





j n j jψ , where 1{ }, , cnj jj . Note that  0 1,0 ,0, , cn ψ  denotes the undamaged state.  
Let the DIV d j  be given, which is obtained for any of these states jψ , whether undamaged or damaged, and 
let its probability density function be given by ( | )f dj jψ . The probabilities of indication and of no-indication 
given a damaged structural system can then be calculated by integrating the probability densities of the DIV, 
namely 




SP I f d d

 j j j jψ ψ , (16) 






P I f d d

 j j j jψ ψ .           (17) 
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Note that the probability of no-indication in (16) is the type II error. In the considered damage detection 
method, the DIV is 
2  distributed (Equ. (11)). Thus, the probability density function f corresponds to the 
classical 
2  distribution in the undamaged state, and to the non-central 
2  distribution in the damaged state, 
respectively. An example of the distributions of DIVs 0d  and d j  with 0j  are given in Figure 2. The 
threshold, which is set up from test values in the reference state for a given type I error, the type II error 
(corresponding to (16)) and the probability of indication (corresponding to (17)) are depicted. 
The distribution of the DIV that is required to evaluate the probabilities in Equ. (16) and (17) may be obtained 
in two different ways. First, it can be derived from the theoretical properties of the DDA, the damage state and 
(assumptions on the) statistical properties of the measurement data. For the presented damage detection method, 
the distribution of the DIV is known depending on a damage parameterization (see details e.g. in [4,47]). In this 
case, the damage parameters can be obtained from a finite element model of the structure. Second, the 
distribution of the DIV may be obtained numerically from Monte Carlo simulations, where measurement data 
is simulated in the respective damage states. This second option is particularly useful when the theoretical DIV 
distribution is unknown or difficult to evaluate, however, it comes with an additional computational burden. 
 
Figure 2: Scheme of probability density functions (pdf) of damage detection test statistic d in the reference and in a damaged state. 
 
An example of the probability of indication computed with Equ. (17) is depicted in Figure 3 for a system 
with two components, building upon the subspace-based DDA (Section 2.2). It is observed that the probability 
of indication of a damage state   
1 21, 2,
| ,S j jP I    with  1 20, 0j j   is higher than for component damage 
states (   
1 21, 2,




Figure 3: Example of a probability of indication curve for a system consisting of two components in dependency of the component 
damage state 
1 11, 1 1, Dj j n
    and 2 22, 1 2, Dj j n   and  ,0 1,0 2,0,S    
 
 
Note that the determination of the probability of indication for a structural system accounting for all possible 
damages states may be a non-trivial task as the number of the damage states increases exponentially with an 
increasing number of components. One approach to circumvent this challenge is to infer the probability of 
indication by the properties of the damage detection algorithm [47]. 
3.3 Structural system performance updating 
The approaches of structural reliability updating underwent several developments in the last decades. An 
early and comprehensive work by [24] contains a framework for updating of the structural reliability including 
inspection and monitoring information and accounting for their measurement uncertainty. Recently, approaches 
emerged for modelling and updating the system deterioration state of structures, taking into account the aspect 
of spatial correlation among element deterioration [14] [1] [27] [36] [31]. However, the impact of deterioration 
on the structural system reliability is seldom included in these works and only very recent studies can be found 
integrating the deterioration and the structural system reliability [23] [32] [41]. The outlined approaches have 
in common that only local information provided by e.g. inspections is utilised, i.e. these approaches do not 
cover the characteristics of damage detection system (DDS) information, namely the dependency of the 
measurement system and structural system and that DDS may be able to detect correlated component damage 
states with a higher probability. 
The formulation of the structural performance and the DDS performance on system level (Section 3.2) 
facilitates an updating of the structural system reliability. The probability of structural system failure subjected 
to the system damage  cn StΨ  given the DDS information of no-indication,     | |cnS S S SP F t t IΨ , can be 
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It should be noted that DDS information itself refers to a point or period in time, which however, is neglected 
here for clarity. 
The probability of no-indication   | cnS SP I tΨ  given the system damage state can be calculated based on 
the developed approach for the DDS performance calculation (Equ. (17)). Following [20], the marginal 
probability of no-indication is calculated by integrating the product of the conditional probability of no-
indication   1 | cnSP I Ψ  and the joint probability density of the system damage space  cnc nfΨ Ψ  over the 
damage state spaces. The integration is performed over the space 
SI
  which is defined with the limit state 
function 
SI
g  as the difference between the probability of indication  | cnSP I Ψ  and a uniformly distributed 
random variable u , holding 
      1 | dc c cnc
IS
n n n
S SP I P I f

  ΨΨ Ψ Ψ  with   | cS S
n
SI I
g P I u   Ψ . 
 
(19) 
To illustrate the characteristics of DDS information, the risk quantification model is further detailed accounting 
for the direct and indirect risks ( DDSR and DDSIDR ) at time St  with DDS information and yielding 





S D S ID S i S S S S S S
i
R t R t R t P F t C P F t I t C

      .
 
(20) 
Only the indirect risks are updated due to the system characteristics of the DDS information. In contrast, the 
direct risks are updated by non-destructive testing (NDT) information as these refer to local damages. It may 
be argued that DDS information may apply to both the structural system and its components. However, the 
updating of the component performance presupposes a damage localisation, which is outside the scope of this 
paper.  
A risk reduction  SR t  can be quantified by subtracting the risk given DDS information and accounting for 
the expected SHM costs  DDS SE C t    from the total risk without DDS information leading to 




A relative risk reduction relates the risk reduction to the total risks not utilizing DDS information with 
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     

 . (22) 
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3.4 Example: structural risk reduction with DDS information for a simplistic structural system 
To illustrate the developed approach, the effect of structural system and DDS characteristics on the structural 
reliability and risk are quantified. For clarity, a simplistic structural system subjected to deterioration consisting 
of two components and a DDS comprising two sensors and a subspace based DDA (Figure 4). The structural 
system is described with its static, dynamic, deterioration, reliability and consequences characteristics as 
required and outlined in the previous sections. 
 
Figure 4: Structural system with sensor locations 
 
 
The structural system properties are modelled with distributed component stiffness and mass subjected to a 
structural damping of 2% for each mode, see Table 1. The system behaviour is calculated with the Finite 
Element method. For each of the structural components, 100Dn   damaged states 
11, j
  and 
22, j
 are considered, 
corresponding to stiffness loss from 0 to 10%, respectively. The resulting system damage states are 
1 21, 2,
{ , }j jjψ    for 1 2, 1, , Djj n   . 
 
Table 1 : Structural model properties 
Parameter Value 
Mass per component 0.5 
Stiffness of component 1: 1EA   1000 
Stiffness of component 2: 2EA   2000 
Damping ratio 2 % 
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 
. (23) 
The formulation contains the number of components 2cn   with the random variables component resistance 
iR  (dependent on the time St ), system loading S  and their associated model uncertainties ,R iM  and SM , 
respectively. The time dependent resistance  i SR t  of the component i  is modelled with the initial resistance 
,0iR  and the time dependent damage  i SD t , i.e. 
    ,0 1i i i SR t R D t  . (24) 
For clarity, the temporal dependence of the damage is neglected in the further. 
The structural reliability model is summarised in Table 2 and Table 3. The system loading is represented 
with a Weibull distributed random variable S  which results by equilibrium in the component loading iS . The 
loading and resistance model uncertainties and the resistance model are determined according to [21] as 
Lognormal distributed with a standard deviation of 10%. The component probability of failure is calibrated to 
31 10 (when not varied) by adjusting the mean of the component resistance in the undamaged state taking basis 
in ISO 2394 (2015) [49] and the JCSS Probabilistic Model Code [21]. The correlation of the resistances and 
the deterioration are modelled with a coefficient of correlation of 0.5 when not varied. 
 
Table 2 : Structural reliability model 
Random variable Distribution Mean Standard deviation 
Loading S  WBL 3.50 0.1 
Model uncertainty SM  LN 1.00 0.1 
Component resistances in undamaged state 
0,iR  LN Calibrated  0.1 
Model uncertainty ,R iM  LN 1.00 0.1 
Damage iD  N 0.07 0.03 
 
Table 3 : Correlation model 
Random variables Coefficient of correlation 
Resistances 
0R
  0.5 (when not varied) 
Damages D  0.5 (when not varied) 
 
 
The consequence model for the calculation of risks builds upon generic normalized costs for component 
failure c 1.0C  , structural system failure 100SC   (see e.g. [2]) and the DDS, DDSC , comprising the DDS 
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investment (1.33x10-4 per channel), installation (1.33x10-4 per channel) and operation (1.33x10-4 per year) in 
accordance with [39]. 
The DDS is modelled with the acceleration sensors 1s  in X-direction and 2s  in Y-direction recording the 
responses ky  from system (3)-(5), using the subspace-based DDA as described in Section 2.2. Based on the 
dynamic structural system model, 1000 datasets of length N = 10000 at a sampling frequency of 50 Hz are 
simulated for each of the undamaged and damaged states for both sensors from white noise excitation. 
The probabilities of indication ( | )SP I jψ  and 0( | )SP I ψ  are determined for the considered DIV in (11) 
with the threshold Dt  corresponding to a 0.01 probability of a type I error (see also Figure 2). The DDA takes 
into account the uncertainties related to the measurement data of finite length N, which is due to the unknown 
ambient excitation and the measurement noise. Human errors in the application and operation are accounted by 
the multiplication of the PoI with a factor of 0.95, see [42]. 
The probabilities of indication based on data from sensor 1s  and based on data from sensor 2s  in dependency 
of the system damage state defined as axial stiffness reduction are depicted in Figure 5. It is observed that the 
probabilities of indication based on sensor 2s  are significantly higher which is caused by the higher axial 
stiffness of the system in Y-direction and thus higher absolute stiffness changes due to the simulated damages. 
It is further observed that a damage of similar size in both components can be detected with a higher probability 
than an individual damage in one of the components. 
 
 
Figure 5: Probability of indication for sensor s1 (left) and s2 (right) in dependency of the system damage state 
 
The DDS information are utilised to update the structural system reliability of the deteriorated structural system. 
The correlation characteristics of the deteriorated structural system may vary significantly due to the 
component, the system and deterioration characteristics (as identified in Section 2.1). The updated reliabilities 
and risks are thus depicted in dependency of the resistance and deterioration correlation to allow for more 
generality of the example. 
The deteriorated series system without updating by DDS information shows a slight decrease of the 
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D  (Figure 6). When utilizing the DDS information, the failure probability decreases and a higher decrease rate 
for the deterioration correlation is observed for sensor 1s  and 2s . However, both effects are significantly more 
pronounced for sensor 2s  due to the higher probabilities of indication (see Figure 6 left and right). The higher 
decrease rate for the damage correlation in comparison to the resistance correlation is explained by the higher 
probability of indication for correlated damages of the same size, i.e. the higher the system deterioration the 
better the DDS performance. 
An exponential dependency of the structural system failure probability on the component probability of 
failure is observed (Figure 6 right). The dependency is explained by the interdependency of the component 
failure and the system failure. The system failure probability is more reduced when using sensor 2s  due to the 
higher probability of indication of the structural damages. 
 
   
Figure 6: Prior and posterior system probability of failure (  SP F  and  |S SP F I ) in dependency of the resistance correlation, the 
damage correlation (left) and the probability of component failure (right) for different sensor positions. 
 
The risk reduction R  and the relative risk reduction /R R  according to Equ. (21) and (22) in dependency 
of the damage and the resistance correlation are shown in Figure 7. The risk reduction for both sensors is 
positive despite considering the expected SHM costs which means that the expected SHM costs are over-
compensated by the risk reduction due to the DDS information. 
It is observed that sensor 2s  leads to a significantly higher risk reduction than sensor 1s  caused by higher 
reduction of the probability of system failure. The higher risk reduction decrease rate observed for the damage 
correlation is in line with the findings in [49]. 
The relative risk reduction relates the absolute risk reduction to the total risks not utilizing DDS information 
and can thus be seen as a measure for the significance of the risk reduction. The risk reduction varies between 
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relative risk reduction in dependency of the damage and the resistance correlation is very similar to the risk 
reduction as the system failure probability varies linearly and to a limited extend. 
 
  
Figure 7: Structural risk reduction R  and /R R  in dependency of the resistance and the damage correlation for different sensor 
positions. 
 
A higher absolute risk reduction is observed for systems with a higher probability of component and thus 
system failure (Figure 8 left). This effect was also observed for a ductile Daniels system with the SHM strategy 
of load monitoring [41]. However, the relative risk reduction (Figure 8 right) decreases as the system risk 
increase rate is higher than the risk reduction rate. 
 
  
Figure 8: Structural risk reduction R  (left) and /R R  (right) in dependency of the component probability of failure for different 
sensor positions. 
 
It has been demonstrated that a significantly higher uncertainty and risk reduction can be achieved with 
sensor 
2s . The performance of the sensor in the context of this study relies on capturing more efficiently the 
dynamic behaviour of the structural system facilitating a higher sensitivity and thus a higher probability to 
detect small damages. For a further optimisation of DDS these characteristics and the interrelations of the 
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4 UTILITY GAIN QUANTIFICATION FOR DAMAGE DETECTION INFORMATION 
The Value of Damage Detection Information, i.e. the utility gain by applying DDSs, can be quantified based 
on the approaches for the quantification of Value of Structural Health Monitoring Information (V ) [49], as the 
difference between the life cycle benefits 1B  and 0B  with and without the DDS strategy i : 




The expected value of the life cycle benefit 0B  is formulated as a prior decision analysis, i.e. the 
maximization of the expected benefits 0b  with the nk  action choices 1 n
T
k ka a a   a
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k X k l
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a arg max E b a ,X    . 
(26) 
Utilizing DDS strategies is , the expected value of the life cycle benefit 1B  is calculated by additionally 
considering the nj  uncertain DDS information 1i i i i n
T
s s , s , j s , jI I I   I  with the extensive form of a pre-
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Figure 9: Illustration of a decision tree for the assessment of the Value of Information containing decision nodes (rectangulars) and chance nodes 
(circles) 
The calculation of the expected benefits necessitates explicit benefit, cost and risk models in dependency 
DDS strategies, its outcomes, the actions and the life cycle performance. These models are exemplarily 
developed in the next section for a case study with a bridge girder system subjected to deterioration. 
No DDS information 
Choice  Chance  
Chance  Choice  




5 CASE STUDY: VALUE OF DAMAGE DETECTION INFORMATION FOR A PRATT TRUSS 
BRIDGE GIRDER 
A statically determinate Pratt truss bridge girder is analysed as shown in Figure 9. It is assumed that the Pratt 
truss bridge girder has been operated for 5 years without inspection. A further operation until the end of the 
service life SLT  of 50 years is intended. There are indications that the bridge may undergo an abnormal and very 
high deterioration. The bridge manager knows that a DDS will deliver more information on the condition of the 
structure but does not know at which point in time during the service life the condition assessment should be 
performed. In order to determine an optimal point in time, the bridge manager performs a Value of DDS 
Information analysis. 
 
Figure 10: Pratt truss bridge girder with a distributed load (arrows) and the sensor locations (double arrows). 
 
The bridge is assumed to be in two system states namely in the failure or safe state. Failure of the truss is 
caused by component failure due the non-redundant system characteristic and will lead to the costs FC . 
Component failure is caused by extreme loads in combination with the damage development over time. The 
bridge manager has two options, i.e. to do nothing (action 0a ) or to repair (action 1a ) which will cost 𝐶𝑅. Repair 
is modelled here as a full reconditioning and it is assumed that all damaged components are exchanged.  
The probability of system failure  SP F  can be calculated with a series system formulation with annual 
(year j ) damage increments , ,D i j  . The initial resistance is reduced by the square of the resistance reduction, 
which can be shown to be proportional to a corrosion induced diameter and consequently section loss. The 
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  (28) 
 
The static, dynamic and the structural reliability models of the Pratt truss bridge girder are summarized in 
Table 2 and Table 4. The annual deterioration has been assessed and , ,D i j  is assumed to follow a Lognormal 
distribution with a mean of 0.001 and a standard deviation of 0.001. The mean of the resistance Ri,0 is calibrated 
20 
to a probability of 1 ∙ 10−6 disregarding any damage, considering that the consequence of failure is large and 
the relative costs of safety measures are small, [21] and [50]. The probabilistic annual extreme loading S  
applied vertically on the truss and it is evenly distributed on the lower nodes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 with 1/ 7iS S 
.  
Table 4 : Structural model properties 
Parameter Value 
Mass per component 0.02 
Young’s modules E 14400 
Cross section A 10/144 
Length of non-diagonal element 10 
Length of diagonal element 10√2 
Damping ratio 2 % 
 
 
The cumulative probability of system failure with time and with changes of the damage and resistance 
correlation coefficient is shown in Figure 11. For a constant coefficient of correlation, the probability of system 
failure increases with time due to the accumulated deterioration damage. When varying the coefficient of 
correlation from 0.1, 0.5 to 0.9, the results indicate that with an increase of the coefficient of correlation, the 
probability of system failure decreases. 
 
 




= 0.1, 0.5, 0.9. 
The damage detection system is modelled with acceleration sensors located in node 12, 13, 14 of the truss 
in vertical direction recording the response using the subspace based DDA (Figure 10). The probabilities of 
indication and the probability of truss system failure given the DDS information of no-indication are calculated 
following Section 3.2. The individual probabilities and an exemplary joint probability of indication are shown 
in Figure 12. A DDS employment causes costs of DDSC  and may cause also damage localisation costs locC  in 
































Figure 12: Probabilities of indication in dependency of the stiffness loss in 29 components (left) and joint probability of indication 
for components 1 and 2 (right). 
 
  In Figure 13, the effect of the updating of the structural system reliability is shown for one DDS utilisation 
(see Equ. (18)) for the different considered damage failure correlations and for different DDS employment 
years.  
 
Figure 13: Posterior system probability of failure  |S SP F I with varied ρR0,i=ρΔD,i=0.1, 0.5 ,0.9 if  implementing DDS at year 10  




=0.5 if  implementing DDS at year 10 ,20, 30 or 
40 (right). 
 
The illustration of the decision analysis for the quantification the Value of DDS Information V  is presented in 
Figure 14 taking basis in the formulation in Section 4. The analysis encompasses the basic decision whether to 
employ a DDS for condition assessment or not, the DSS strategies, their outcomes, the actions and the system 
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Figure 14: Illustration of decision tree combining a prior decision analysis (branch with no DDS) and a pre-posterior decision analysis 
to calculated the optimal expected life cycle benefit *B for one point in time. 
The cost model based on [45] and [51] is shown in Table 5. All costs are discounted with a discount rate of 
0.02.  During the service life of the bridge, a target system failure probability of 1 ∙ 10−4 is required as the costs 
for safety measures are high and the consequences remain high, see [21] and [50]. The cost of repair RC  
increases with time due to the damage accumulation and is modelled in dependency of the investment costs IC  
and the service life SLT , see Equ. (29). When the bridge is repaired, it is assumed that all damaged components 











The failure costs FC  are assumed to be a factor 100 higher than the investment costs due to indirect 
consequences. Localisation costs locC   and DDS application costs DDSC   are assumed to equal 0.1 following 
e.g. [45]. 









locC   
DDS 
cost CDDS  
Value 0.02 10 1000 0.1 0.1 
 
Figure 15 shows the expected costs and risks and the Value of DDS Information in dependency of the DDS 
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is at year 7 with a significant relative Value of DDS Information of 11%. Very low values of DDS Information 
are observed in year 6 where the DDS information do not influence the repair actions. Only DDS employment 
in year 7 will lead to changes in the repair actions and hence a reduction of the expected repair costs. The Value 
of DDS Information is decreasing in the consecutive years as the period for which the DDS information provide 
a risk reduction becomes shorter. A drop of the Value DDS Information occurs in year 13 as here the optimal 
action becomes repair also for the branch without the DDS information as enforced by the target reliability of 
10-4.  
 
Figure 15: Expected costs and risks (left) and Value of DDS Information in dependency of the DDS employment year 





=0.9 (right)  
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The introduced approach facilitates the updating of the structural reliability and risks with damage detection 
system (DDS) information on system level for both the DDS and the structural system. The DDS performance 
modelling accounts for the characteristics and dependencies of the structural system damage states and 
encompasses the measurement system (number of sensors, sensor positions, precision of the system including 
human errors) and the employed damage detection algorithms (DDAs). The structural system damage states 
necessitate a consistent modelling in terms of the static, dynamic and deterioration characteristics in order to 
derive the structural reliability and risk as well as the DDS performance models. 
The introduced DDS performance modelling facilitates a comparison and assessment of various DDS, on 
the basis of the probabilistic indication characteristics on DDS and structural system level with e.g. the system- 
and/or component-wise and structural system specific probability of indication. The calculation of the DDS 
performance may be subjected to substantial demands either experimentally or computationally, as the system 
damage state space is increasing with the number of components in the exponent. Several strategies to overcome 










































The quantification of the Value of DDS Information may serve as a basis for DDS design. In this perspective, 
a DDS (i.e. e.g. the number of sensors, the sensor positions, the precision, the DDA) can be optimised to achieve 
a maximum expected life cycle benefit for a specific structural system or a class of structural systems. 
With two case studies, the potential of the approach has been demonstrated in terms of a significant Value 
of DDS Information and structural system risk reduction utilizing a subspace-based DDA. The approach is 
generalizable to other DDAs, requiring the indication characteristics for a discretization of the system damage 
state space for a chosen DDA. 
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